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Views differ on how to teach an introductory course of philosophy and 
how an introductory book to philosophy should look like. Boran Berčić, 
full professor of philosophy at the University of Rijeka, and, let us put 
the cards on the table, a colleague of mine, with this first volume of a two 
volume book answers resolutely to these problems. The answer is that the 
best way to introduce someone to philosophy is to teach her to philoso-
phise. Of course, this good answer is easy to give; writing a book consist-
ent with it is surely harder. Berčić has succeeded in the task.
The guiding principle of the book is that philosophy aims at offering 
well informed and convincing arguments to support or criticise attempted 
solutions to philosophical problems. Moreover, learning to philosophise 
requires understanding the philosophical problem at issue, knowing the 
most relevant attempted philosophical solutions (or dissolutions) of this 
problem, and mastering the more relevant arguments used to support or 
criticise these solutions. Finally, and hopefully, this knowledge would en-
able the reader, who is armed with a bit of theoretical courage and will, to 
jump responsibly into the philosophical debate.
The book, thus, is structured around a good selection of problems that 
are currently debated by analytic philosophers around the world. Moreo-
ver, the author in many places argues for his views. So, although the rel-
evant positions and arguments of some “mighty dead” are covered, the 
reader who wants to know about the history of philosophy, understood as 
a chronology of authors, books, and movements seen in a wider socio-cul-
tural context, if she really has to, might like to read another book.
The fist chapter deals with the problem of the meaning of life. Ac-
cording to the author, we get to this problem if we ask what should be the 
more general considerations that should guide all our actions. While it is 
relatively unproblematic that catching the train for a certain destination 
makes sense, given that we want to reach that destination, it is difficult to 
answer the general question of what confers sense to the complete series 
of the actions that preceded our taking the train and all those that will fol-
low it. The author offers carefully crafted arguments for concluding that 
happiness, caring for the others, submitting to the plans of some god, the 
advancement of the species, cannot confer this sense. However, the over-
all conclusion of the chapter is not too disparaging. The fact that there is 
not an ultimate, foundational, “Meaning” of life does not imply the spe-
cific actions that constitute our lives are without sense.
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The second chapter concerns the problem whether death is bad for us. 
Berčić thinks that it is. Against Epicurus, who maintained that nothing bad 
can happen to the deceased, he argues that death is bad because it deprives 
us of possible experiences. Lucretius argued that we should not worry 
about our death because we do not worry about our inexistence before 
our birth. Berčić replies that our past and future inexistence differ signifi-
cantly. First, an individual’s lack of existence before her birth differs from 
her ceasing to exist after her death. Second, we are very concerned about 
events that will happen to us in the immediate future. Thirdly, delaying the 
date of death is a feature of the life of a certain individual, while anticipat-
ing her birth would concern a different individual.
The third chapter considers fatalism, the view that we cannot produce 
any event or prevent it from taking place. Let us consider here Berčić’s treat-
ment of the traditional idle argument that has been revamped by Michael 
Dummett. Given that x stands for a certain event, this argument goes as 
follows: (1) Either x will happen or x will not happen. (2) If x will happen, 
x it will happen no matter what it is done to prevent x from happening. (3) 
If x will not happen, x it will not happen no matter what is done to produce 
x. Therefore: (4) I cannot determine whether x will or will not happen.
Berčić thinks that the argument is vitiated by the ambiguous epis-
temic status of premises (1) and (2) (78). If these premises are empirical, 
they are false. In fact, it is an empirical fact that bringing about a certain 
event will increase or reduce the probability of another event. On the other 
horn of the dilemma, if the premises are a priori, they are true, being in-
stances of (P implies P). But they are irrelevant for the problem at issue, 
given that, by being tautologies, they are true independently of how the 
world is, and thus cannot tell us anything about how certain events would 
prevent or promote others.
Besides dismantling some arguments for fatalism, as the one concern-
ing the so called future contingents discussed by Aristotle, Berčić argues 
that, not knowing whether fatalism is true or not, it is rational to behave as 
if it were false. In fact, if our actions make a difference, not acting would 
bring worst results than acting when the outcome is in any case deter-
mined and independent from our actions (90).
The discussion of the problem of free will occupies the long and 
detailed fourth chapter. Notoriously, the problem is that of reconciling 
determinism, roughly, the idea that every event in the world is caused, de-
termined or has it probability fixed by previous events in accordance with 
some laws, and the idea that we are free. Freedom is, roughly, understood 
as involving events that do not take part in the chain of determination 
that extend well beyond our birth. After exploring different versions of 
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the thesis of determinism, the reasons for endorsing them, and the spe-
cific problem of free will that they generate, Berčić sets out the possible 
solutions to these problems. Incompatibilists maintain that determinism 
and freedom are incompatible, amongst them libertarians think that we 
are free, while determinists think that we are determinate. Compatibilists 
think that determinism and free will are compatible, some amongst them 
go even further and say that we cannot be free unless determinism is true, 
others, contenting themselves with the mere compatibility, do not engage 
with the issue whether or not determinism is true or has to be true. After 
his critical discussion of libertarianism and determinism, it emerges that 
Berčić’s sympathies go to compatibilism. The hard task for this doctrine is 
to carve out a class of deterministic events that we can call free. Following 
an account set out by Gary Watson, Berčić settle for the idea that certain 
events, such a deliberations and actions, that are determined in accordance 
with our judgements about what we ought to do, are free (186–187).
Berčić tackles the topic of moral responsibility in the fifth chapter, 
so correctly running it separately from the issue of free-will. In fact, it 
is a philosophically contentious problem whether freedom is a necessary 
requirement for moral responsibility.
The sixth chapter is dedicated to ethics and firstly addresses the de-
bate between consequentialists and deontologists. The former think that 
the moral goodness of an action, deliberation or character trait, depends on 
that of its consequences. In particular, utilitarianism establishes the moral 
goodness of consequences in terms of a measurable maximisation of hap-
piness. The common criticism is that the maximisation of happiness for 
a larger group of individuals might recommend serious violations of the 
rights of few; for example, as sacrificing a scapegoat to avoid social unrest. 
On the other hand, deontological approaches to ethics recommend that we 
should establish what we should do in accordance to certain principles, 
irrespective of the consequences. Berčić offers a very lucid presentation 
of Kant’s fascinating brand of deontological ethics. The third option taken 
into consideration is the virtue ethics of Aristotle. Instead of focussing 
on the consequence or the reference to principles, the sources of morality 
should stem from a certain type person with certain features or virtues.
Issues of political philosophy are addressed in the seventh chapter. 
Specifically, Berčić discusses in depth the social contract account of the 
justification of the state. The most promising formulation of this approach 
is the hypothetical version, according to which the state or better a cer-
tain specific configuration of it is justified insofar a rational individual 
would voluntarily and freely commit to the relative contract. Thus, Berčić 
explores in detail the complexities of the rationality of cooperation as 
studied in relation to famous theoretical cases, such as the prisoner’s di-
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lemma. Specifically, he offers a very exhaustive and lucid treatment of 
John Rawls’s celebrated method to work out the ideal requirements of the 
social contract. These are the principles that would be chosen by rational 
agents who do not know, amongst other things, their socio-economic po-
sition in the society that will be regulated by these rules. In particular, 
Berčić is convinced, and surely will convince many readers, that a con-
tract underwritten by fully rational individuals will deliver norms that are 
objectively valid because they are exactly those that take into due account 
the objective interests of these individuals (378–382).
Moral objectivism is further explored and defended in the closing 
chapter. This chapter concerns a more esoteric problem than those ap-
proached in the previous chapters: what are values? However, this appears 
an apt closing of the book, especially if the readers get there after reading, 
and thinking through, whichever of the other chapters, where values play 
a significant role. In fact, thinking about the materials in this last chapter 
can really fire back nicely on whatever the reader might have come to 
conclude about the previously encountered problems.
So, the book offers a problem-oriented approach to philosophy, a good 
selection of problems, and an accurate and informed rendering of relevant 
past and contemporary positions and arguments. This would not make 
this introduction outstanding. For instance, also to the Croatian public are 
available the introductory books by philosophers of the highest calibre 
such as Thomas Nagel or Simon Blackburn.14However, the presentations 
of these authors are quite condensed. In addition, more than offering a 
fair amount of alternative theories and arguments, they wrote these books 
principally as vehicles for their views. Berčić, instead, in a real pedagogi-
cal tour de force, introduces the main philosophical problems, theories 
and arguments in a very detailed, intuitive and progressive way.
Surely the curious seasoned philosopher, who has not specialised in 
the fields covered in the book, might feel that he could have found her 
way without the carefully crafted introductory materials. Nevertheless, the 
teacher in her will surely admire and appreciate the rich variety of stylistic 
and rhetorical tools employed and, above all, the brilliance, and in some 
case the humour, of many examples. These devices will surely make the 
issues accessible to beginners and then lead them to the quite sophisticated 
materials that are contained in this volume. In addition, going through the 
batteries of thought provoking questions at the end of each chapter, that 
might appear to be directed at students, can be a rewarding (and sometime 
frustrating) experience also for more advanced readers. This book really 
1 T. Nagel, Što sve to znači?, prev. B. Berčić, Zagreb: Kruzak, 2002; S. Blackburn, 
Poziv na misao: poticajni uvod u filozofiju, prev. L. Jurica, Zagreb: AGM, 2002.
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shows that it derives from almost twelve years of experience in teaching 
introductory courses of philosophy.
So, to sum up, this book is a major achievement in itself and even 
more so when compared with what is presently available in Croatian. So, 
who should buy this reasonably priced book (presently 23 lipas per page)? 
Surely anyone interested in being correctly informed about what contempo-
rary philosophers are up to and who would like to join their debates. There-
fore, it seems that general readers and undergraduate philosophy students 
might be the ideal target. However, teachers of philosophy, who worry 
seriously about teaching their subject starting at an introductory level, will 
find a lot to learn from this book and should seriously consider adopting it 
for their courses. Professional philosophers who are not too familiar with 
the covered problems will surely find the volume useful. Finally, special-
ists might like to engage with Berčić’s own original positions.
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Dan Zahavi, Husserlova fenomenologija, preveo Nebojša Mudri, 
priredio Damir Barbarić, Zagreb: AGM, 2011, 252 str.
Ova opsegom mala knjižica vrlo je dobar i suvremen uvod u fenomenolo-
giju Edmunda Husserla, kako autor knjige Dan Zahavi u Zaključku kaže: 
središnje figure filozofije 20. stoljeća. Osim toga ta je knjiga i dobro i s 
razumijevanjem prevedena – što je pretpostavka da ju se s razumijeva-
njem može i čitati. Kao osobitost te knjige može se spomenuti i to da se taj 
uvod u Husserla ne temelji samo na spisima koja je sam Husserl objavio, 
nego uzima u obzir i tekstove iz ostavštine i rukopisne te one koje su već 
objavljeni u ediciji Husserliana.
Knjiga se dijeli, prema opće prihvaćenoj podjeli Husserlovog filozo-
firanja, na 1. ranog Husserla, 2. Husserlov okret transcendentalnoj filozo-
fiji i epoché i 3. kasnijeg Husserla. U okviru te osnovne podjele razmatra 
